UIJRT » United International Journal for Research & Technology

Security Issues of Network Mobility (NEMO) with Tor Architecture

Mohd. Altamash Sheikh
Keywords: NEMO, TOR, IPv4, IPv6, MIPv6.

Cite ➜

Sheikh, M.A., 2020. Security Issues of Network Mobility (NEMO) with Tor Architecture. United International Journal for Research & Technology (UIJRT), 1(4), pp.25-29.

Abstract

In this paper we discuss NEMO-BSP protocol and TOR architecture. NEMO protocol was initially not designed to handle anonymity of TOR architecture. Due to some of the unique feature of TOR architecture, the use of TOR architecture has been rapidly increased these days. TOR architecture provides anonymity which other network architectures failed to provides. When using a TOR a user feels safe and has no issue of tracking and packet tracing. Therefore, whenever a NEMO user uses TOR architecture there are much vulnerability in network. In this paper we outline those security issues in details which arise when a NEMO user uses TOR architecture. We hope in future those issues will be solved and implemented in future so that a user not only remains anonymous while using TOR but also remains secure from various types of vulnerabilities.

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